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Free Belief: The Medieval Heritage in Kant’s Moral Faith 
 
Abstract: In this article, I argue that when Kant describes faith as a free-choice, he is aligned 
with the medieval tradition, and with his own sources that mediate this heritage (in particular, 
Leibniz and Locke). Tradition consistently, affirmatively, and systematically, invokes 
freedom and the will, with reference to belief in God, without such a dimension of choice 
implying any deflation in the degree of commitment to this belief. But, in clarifying that it is 
“human freedom” alone, without divine action, Kant departs from this same tradition, as 
mediated to him through his sources. Such divine action, Kant is convinced, would destroy 
significant human freedom. This conviction is the source of Kant’s repeated insistence that 
grace follows rather than precedes moral conversion. It is this claim that departs significantly 
from the medieval tradition, as mediated to Kant, rather than the suggestion that we choose to 
believe in God. 
 
Keywords: Kant, Aquinas, knowledge, opinion, faith, belief, morality, practical reason   
 
 
Kant famously rules out the possibility of any knowledge of God’s existence or non-existence 
(A 590/B 618–A 742–44; A 742–44–B 770–72).1 In denying the possibility of knowledge 
about God, Kant departs from his rationalist sources, and from his own earlier position (OPA 
2:63–163). Leibniz,2 Wolff,3 Locke,4 Crusius,5 Meier,6 and Baumgarten,7 all assert that we 
can have knowledge (Wissen) of the existence and properties of God. Although Kant finds 
that there is an absence of evidence sufficient for knowledge about God’s existence, or non-
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existence, this is not, for Kant, a disordered or regrettable deficit. Indeed, Kant finds it 
“providential” that God has not permitted such knowledge. Kant even tells us that we should 
“thank heaven” that “our faith [Glaube] is not knowledge”: 
 
<ext> 
For divine wisdom is apparent in the very fact that we do not know but rather ought to 
believe that a God exists. (“Pölitz,” 28:1084) 
</ext> 
 
Kant takes seriously the recommendation that we “ought to believe that a God exists.” 
In the Dialectic of the second Critique, Kant argues that not only are we permitted to believe 
in God, but we are rationally required to do so, because the realization of the highest good, 
replete with happiness, can only be achieved by a “supreme cause of nature having a 
causality in keeping with the moral disposition” (CPrR 5:125). The ‘highest good’ is the state 
where everyone obeys the moral law and achieves happiness in proportion to virtue. Belief in 
God is “necessary” for our practical reason, as the “highest good” is “possible only under the 
condition of the existence of God,” which connects “the presupposition of the existence of 
God inseparably with duty” (CPrR 5:125; see also A 829/B 857; CJ 5:444, 469).   
The absence of evidence is overcome, for Kant, by a movement of the will, involving 
a “free affirmation” of “I believe in God” (Progress, 20:298). This notion of faith as a “free 
affirmation” is repeated across Kant’s texts. In the second Critique, Kant writes that belief in 
God “rests with our choice” (CPrR 5:145). “Matters of belief,” Kant explains in the Jäsche 
Logic, are “necessarily free” (“Jäsche,” 9:70). In section §91 of the third Critique, Kant 
explains that “the faith,” which is “related to particular objects that are not objects of possible 
knowledge or opinion,” is “entirely moral”: 
 
<ext> 
It is a free affirmation, not one for which dogmatic proofs for the theoretically determining 
power of judgment are to be found, nor one to which we hold ourselves to be obligated, but 
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one which we assume for the sake of an aim in accordance with the laws of freedom. (CJ 
5:472) 
</ext> 
 
The contention of this article is that Kant’s notion of faith/belief (Glaube) as a “free 
affirmation” has a complex relationship with two central elements of the medieval tradition 
of reflection upon faith, going back to Thomas Aquinas and Hugh of St Victor. These two 
features are, respectively: the claim that faith is sui generis, combining textures that belong to 
both knowledge and opinion; and, secondly, the conviction that the will assents to the 
propositions of faith, holding to them with a certainty equivalent to knowledge, even without 
the evidence sufficient for the state of knowing. 
It is a solid interpretative principle, which alone justifies the practice of the history of 
philosophy, that one can rarely understand the significance and meaning of what any thinker 
says about a subject, simply by reading what that thinker alone says about this subject. This 
principle applies in this case: through reading Kant alone on Glaube, neglecting his sources, 
and the wider tradition, we receive only a partial sense of the strands of continuity and 
rupture with the previous tradition, and so only a limited sense of the extent to which Kant is 
adopting a traditional, or a “deflationary,” position. We find a good example of the potential 
for such a limited perspective, when we consider Kant’s treatment of the relationship 
between faith, grace, and moral conversion, as set out in the Conflict of the Faculties, where 
Kant engages with the Pietistic theology of Spener and Franck. As we will see, in the first 
part of this article, Kant identifies common ground with the Pietists, insofar as they associate 
faith with freedom, and with morality. The key difference that Kant identifies between his 
account, and that of the Pietists, lies in the identification of the ultimate source of the freedom 
involved in faith. Kant maintains that such freedom is supersensible, and entirely our own. 
Spener (and Franck) hold that this freedom is supernatural, having its origins in divine 
action. Although from this one understands that Kant disagrees with the Pietists, one might 
still harbor the suspicion that Kant has a positive, perhaps largely traditional, conception of 
faith and grace, and of the relationship between divine action and faith. What one can only 
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ascertain by reading Kant’s own sources, in the light of the medieval tradition, is that Kant’s 
account of freedom and faith draws upon traditional themes, but, at a key point, consciously 
swerves away from an entire tradition of theological reflection, as he would have received it.  
 Steps are taken to demonstrate this in the second part of the article, which attends to 
the origins of the notion of faith as a free affirmation. We begin with Hugh of St. Victor and 
Thomas Aquinas, moving on to track how this tradition is mediated through Kant’s own 
sources, predominantly in texts by Leibniz and Locke, which we know Kant to have studied. 
Although Meier is often cited as the figure from whom Kant might have received the 
“opinion, belief, knowledge” trio, it turns out that Meier is not likely to be a source for Kant, 
on this narrow front. Indeed, in employing the trio, Kant seems explicitly to challenge 
features of Meier’s analysis of Glaube. 
 This provides the necessary background for a detailed anatomy, set out in the third 
part of the article, of Kant’s own treatment of the epistemic category of “faith,” as he 
contrasts it, following his sources, with the categories of opinion and knowledge. On the side 
of “continuities” with the prior tradition, we are able to confirm that an emphasis upon the 
voluntary nature of belief in God is perfectly traditional. This is significant, as Kant’s 
language of free-choice with respect to belief in God can be an encouragement to read his 
religious commitment in rather deflationary terms.8 Briskly speaking, the suggestion behind 
such deflationary accounts is that Kant does not recommend belief in God so much as 
proceeding, for heuristic, or practical, purposes as if there is a God. This article demonstrates 
that Kant’s use of the language of free choice and free affirmation, cannot reasonably be used 
as evidence in support of such deflationary readings. We might, of course, have other reasons 
for interpreting Kant’s belief in God in deflationary terms, about which I say nothing here. 
Nonetheless, when Kant talks of faith as a free affirmation, in so doing, he aligns himself 
closely with a traditional understanding, going back to Aquinas, and mediated to Kant 
through figures such as Leibniz and Locke. This tradition consistently, affirmatively, and 
systematically invokes freedom and the will, with reference to our belief in God. To a limited 
extent, then, Kant’s invocation of free-will in the context of faith is traditional, and, I will be 
able to show, Kant would know this.  
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 Equally, though, on the other side, our engagement with the historical sources of the 
notion of free belief reveals where Kant makes some distinctive intra-theological moves, in 
terms of how Kant conceives of the role of divine action in relation to human freedom. To 
say, as both Kant and Aquinas (and others) do, that a belief must be a “free affirmation” is 
not yet to say very much, until we know what human freedom amounts to, both in itself, and 
in relation to divine action. On this point, we will see, in the fourth part of this article, that 
Kant’s position constitutes a rupture with all of his theological sources, which sources affirm 
that faith comes primarily, and originally, from divine action, through grace and revelation. 
In his insistence that faith must be an act of our own freedom, of our own practical reason, 
without divine action or intervention, Kant sets his face against the entire prior theological 
tradition, for reasons that go to the heart of his philosophical project. Nonetheless, as I show 
in the final section, Kant does develop a positive reinterpretation of the theological categories 
of grace, and of divine cooperation with human action, which, by his own lights, does not 
violate significant human freedom.9  
 Curiously, then, by reading Kant alone, without knowing about the historical origins 
of the association of freedom with faith, we can get things precisely the wrong way around. 
Kant’s emphasis upon the need for a voluntary dimension in the case of belief in God can 
look rather “post-Christian” and deflationary, relegating such belief to a heuristic category of 
believing “as if” there is a God. In turn, Kant’s discussion of the way in which grace follows 
moral conversion can look more traditional, with the apparently rather pious association of 
ethical behavior and religious belief. In truth, as we will see, it is the former that is 
traditional, and the latter that is revolutionary. It is revolutionary, because of Kant’s repeated 
insistence that grace follows rather than precedes moral conversion.  
 There have been, recently, a number of sophisticated treatments of Kant’s account of 
‘belief’ (Glaube), or, depending upon the translation, ‘faith,’ to which I am indebted.10 The 
existing literature mentions, but does not explore extensively, as I do here, the role of the will 
in Kant’s understanding of religious belief.11 Some commentators have drawn attention to the 
similarity between the scholastic analysis of “opinion, belief, and knowledge” and Kant’s use 
of the trio. The precise lines of transmission, from scholastic theology to Kant, tend to be 
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gestured toward meaningfully, but rather vaguely, often with a nod to Meier.12 Leslie 
Stevenson comments about the “meinen, glauben and wissen” trio that it “seems to have been 
part of the conventional wisdom of Kant’s day,” and that “presumably it had been handed 
down from medieval theology,” although Stevenson adds, “I do not know by what route.”13 
This article shows precisely what this route might have been. Alix Cohen has done invaluable 
work on the role of the will in Kant’s wider notion of epistemic responsibility, with an 
explicit focus on “empirical beliefs . . . that are always, at least in principle, susceptible of 
evidential support.”14 My article undertakes the distinct, but complementary, task of 
investigating the shape, and origins, of Kant’s conception of the (doxastically responsible) 
role of the will, in the context of religious beliefs, which are not, Kant thinks, susceptible to 
evidential support. 
 
 
1. Faith and Grace: Kant and the Pietists 
 
In the Conflict of the Faculties, Kant is concerned with the relationship between grace, moral 
conversion, and faith. Kant praises Spener, insofar as “the valiant Spener called out fervently 
to all ecclesiastical teachers” that  
 
<ext> 
The end of religious instruction must be to make us other human beings and not merely better 
human beings (as if we were already good but only negligent about the degree of our 
goodness). (CF 7:54) 
</ext> 
 
Kant offers two cheers for Spener, insofar as Spener has understood that the proper task is to 
ask “not only what Christianity is,” but “also how to set about teaching it so that it will really 
be present in the hearts of human beings,” so that “religious faith will also make human 
beings better” (CF 7:53). Although Spener is insightful, Kant thinks, in understanding that 
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“faith” requires a moral conversion, Kant’s reservations about Spener arise because of the 
link that Spener draws between faith (so understood), and “grace,” whereby, for Spener, 
“faith is an effect of grace” (CF 7:56). 
 As I will demonstrate, Kant identifies what he considers to be the key difference 
between his position and that of Spener, on the specific question of grace in relation to moral 
conversion: the difference lies in the distinction between the supersensible (übersinnlich), 
and the supernatural (übernatürlich). Where Kant invokes the category of the 
“supersensible,” which is to say, the realm of non-spatial and non-temporal noumenal 
freedom, Spener makes the mistake of thinking in terms of the “supernatural,” which 
involves divine action. Precisely what we should make of Kant’s notion of “supersensible” 
noumenal freedom is highly contested in Kant studies, and I do not propose to settle this issue 
here.15 But what everybody has to concede is that, in some sense (deflationary or 
metaphysical), Kant is committed to the notion of non-temporal and non-spatial freedom. 
This has to be accepted, just because Kant so often makes recourse to it,16 with the Conflict of 
the Faculties (from the late 1790s), being one more example. Talking about moral 
conversion, whereby we become the “new man” (CF 7:59), Kant affirms that we need to 
invoke a “supersensible freedom,” because “the means to this end cannot be empirical—since 
empirical means could undoubtedly affect our actions but not our attitude [Gesinnung]” (CF 
7:54). A problem arises, though, when one thinks that the “supersensible [Übersinnliche] 
must also be supernatural [übernatürlich],” involving “God’s direct influence” (CF 7:54).  
 Kant’s aversion to this notion of divine action upon us has deep roots in his thought, 
which go right down to his fundamental conception of what significant human freedom must 
consist in. “Freedom cannot be divided,” Kant insists, such that “the human being is either 
entirely free or not free at all” (Refl., 4229, 17:467). Freedom must be a “faculty of starting . . 
. events from itself [sponte], i.e., without the causality of the cause itself having to begin, and 
hence without need for any other ground to determine its beginning” (Prolegomena, 4:344; 
see also A 446/B 474). Kant is clear that God acting upon us would be an “alien cause” 
(CPrR 5:95)17, which would destroy freedom, described by Kant as the “inner value of the 
world” (“Moral Mrongovius,” 27:1482). Kant has a zero-sum account of the relationship 
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between divine action and human freedom. Human freedom is only possible where God 
withdraws. Accordingly, Kant also explicitly rejects the traditional scholastic conception of 
concursus or “concurrence” (although not, as we will see, all construals), whereby it is 
maintained (albeit mysteriously) that divine and human action can run together, directly and 
fully, in single action, such that God is the immediate and direct efficient cause of a free 
human action: 
 
<ext> 
It is not permitted to think of God’s concursus with free actions. . . . If God concurs with 
morality, then the human being has no moral worth, because nothing can be imputed to 
him.18 (DR 28:1309)  
</ext> 
 
 Kant does concede that we cannot know that divine cooperation is impossible (Rel., 
6:44, 52, 142–43; see also “Pölitz,” 28:1106, 1110). This has led Pasternack, for example, to 
talk suggestively of Kant being “agnostic” as to “whether or not we receive any Divine 
assistance in our efforts to morally improve ourselves.”19 Patrick Kain also writes that Kant 
leaves “conceptual room for some kind of dependence within creaturely agency and for the 
possibility of divine concurrence and divine [fore]knowledge of human free actions.”20 
Similarly, and correctly, Jacqueline Mariña points out, that “God’s supernatural cooperation 
in our becoming better persons,” is not for Kant something that we know to be “impossible.” 
But, as Mariña goes onto observe, “its possibility remains inscrutable” such that, “even if it 
were posited, on a practical level we wouldn’t be able to make use of such a supposition.”21 
Kant warns that neither theoretical nor practical reason can make any positive use of such a 
concept of divine action (Rel., 6:53). That said, as I show in section 5, Kant does find an 
acceptable reinterpretation of the categories of grace, and of divine cooperation with human 
action, which can be used within the limits of the pure religion of reason. When I write that 
Kant rejects a “traditional” account of grace and concurrence, this qualifier is vital, as he is 
willing to recommend a reinterpreted and Kantian account of grace and divine cooperation.22 
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 Turning away from traditional accounts of divine cooperation and grace, Kant 
searches for “another principle for solving Spener’s problem” (CF 7:58), which is to say, the 
correctly identified need for the human being to turn towards the moral law. We find such a 
principle when we contemplate “our ability so to sacrifice our sensuous nature to morality,” 
so “that we can do what we quite readily and clearly conceive we ought to do” (CF 7:58): 
 
<ext> 
This ascendancy of the supersensible human being in us over the sensible . . .  is an object of 
the greatest wonder; and our wonder at this moral predisposition in us, inseparable from our 
humanity, only increases the longer we contemplate this true (not fabricated) ideal. (CF 7:58–
59) 
</ext> 
 
Kant diagnoses the tendency to interpret this capacity in supernatural terms, as 
understandable, but mistaken: 
 
<ext> 
Since the supersensible in us is inconceivable and yet practical, we can well excuse those 
who are led to consider it supernatural—that is, to regard it as the influence of another and 
higher spirit, something not within our power and not belonging to us as our own. Yet they 
are greatly mistaken in this, since on their view the effect of this power would not be our 
deed and could not be imputed to us, and so the power to produce it would not be our own. 
(CF 7:59; see also Rel., 6:51) 
</ext> 
 
As already indicated, Kant’s close grappling with Spener and Franck can lead us to see the 
trees, rather than the forest if we accept Kant’s own presentation of his discussion as a 
critique of a strand of Pietistic theology. When, though, we paint on a larger canvass, we see 
that Kant’s particular appropriation of the notion of faith as dependent upon human freedom 
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sounds deep traditional harmonics, as well as, on other fronts, announcing a significant 
rupture with an entire theological tradition. The task of the next section, therefore, is to set 
out the shape of this tradition. 
 I suggest that Locke and Leibniz are likely to have been important sources for Kant. 
Nonetheless, in setting out a possible route through which Kant could have received these 
traditional conceptions of Glaube, my aim is not to rule out the possibility of other influences 
and sources, more or less diffuse, which may be further unveiled, in due course, by other 
scholars. The point is, rather, to avoid drawing anachronistic parallels between scholasticism 
and Kant, by showing how something like the scholastic account was mediated to Kant 
through more immediate and demonstrably known sources.  
 
 
2. The Origins of the Notion of Free Belief, Between Opinion and Knowledge 
 
When considering scholastic and early modern treatments of faith, we are particularly 
concerned to track two commitments, which, we will see in the third part of this article, are 
features of Kant’s own treatment of Glaube, in continuity with a tradition of theological 
reflection. As already outlined, these commitments are as follows: first, that faith combines 
elements of opinion and knowledge, and, secondly, that the will assents to the propositions of 
faith, holding to them with a certainty equivalent to knowledge, albeit without evidence 
sufficient for the state of knowing.  
 
 
2.1. Thomas Aquinas 
 
The trail begins, for us, with Aquinas, who declares that we are in a state of belief when we 
have evidence that is sufficient only for opinion, but adhere to the proposition with the 
certainty appropriate to knowledge. What makes up this absence of evidence is the movement 
of the will, which chooses to belief. So in the act of believing, of which belief in God is the 
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paradigm, the believer “settles upon one side of the question,” in “virtue of his will [per 
voluntatem]” (Sum. theol. IIa–IIae.2.1). This means that the believer becomes “firmly 
attached to one alternative,” and so "is in the same state of mind as one who has science or 
understanding” (Sum. theol. IIa–IIae.2.1), even though belief is “imperfect as knowledge,” as 
it is “without clarity or vision” (Sum. theol. Ia–IIae.67.3). 
 As Debora Shuger explains, Aquinas is able to exploit an ambiguity in the Latin term 
certus (“certainty”), which can mean “(a) established by the evidence, proven,” and/or “(b) 
resolved upon, decided.”23 In a way that will be illuminating for understanding Kant’s 
distinction between what he calls “objective” and “subjective” sufficiency (see section 3), we 
can distinguish between the certainty of evidence, and the certainty of adherence. It is in the 
second sense that faith enjoys certainty, inasmuch as such certus refers to, and requires, an 
act of the will. Faith holds a “middle place,” surpassing “opinion because its adhesion is firm 
[firmam inhaesionem],” but falling “short of knowledge (scientia), because it lacks vision” 
(Sum. theol. Ia–IIae.67.3).24 This distinction rests upon what Shuger identifies as the central 
dilemma of “all pre-modern epistemology,”25 which is that there is an “inverse proportion 
between the excellence of an object and its knowability: the more excellent the object, the 
less knowable to us.”26 This goes back to Aristotle, who in the Posterior Analytics 
distinguishes between what is, on the one hand, “prior and more knowable . . . in nature,” 
and, on the other hand, that which is more knowable “in relation to us.” It is the lesser objects 
that are “more knowable” in “relation to us,” because they are “nearer to our perception,” 
while the objects “more knowable” in themselves are “further” from our perception:  
 
<ext> 
The most universal concepts are furthest from our perception and particulars are nearest to it . 
. . these are opposite to one another. (Posterior Analytics, 1.2, 71b35–72a6)  
</ext> 
 
 For Aquinas, it is the movement of the will that overcomes this absence of evidence, 
in this life, with respect to matters of faith, in that it “adheres totally” to faith by virtue of the 
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“will, which chooses to assent determinately and precisely to one part because of something 
that is sufficient to move the will but not sufficient to move the intellect” (De veritate, 14.1). 
Aquinas’s position is often summarized as the claim that “faith is mid-way between science 
and opinion” (Sum. theol. IIa–IIae.1.2), which is an English rendering of “fides est media 
inter scientiam et opinionem” (Sum. theol., IIa–IIae.1.2). Aquinas himself derives this 
statement from the “widely accepted” scholastic “definition of faith”27 presented by Hugh of 
St Victor: “faith is a form of mental certitude about distant realities that is greater than 
opinion and less than science.” 28 I have at points mirrored this standard usage, and will 
continue to do so, talking of belief as being “between” knowledge and opinion. Nonetheless, 
this phrasing should come with a caveat. It is important for Aquinas, as indeed it will be for 
Kant, that the conceptual space of being “between” opinion and knowledge is not to be 
understood as the mean-point of a continuous spectrum, whereby one can, 
straightforwardly,29 move, by accumulating evidence, from opinion, through faith, to 
knowledge. Faith, rather, is “between” in the sense of being sui generis, sharing features with 
both opinion and knowledge, enjoying a certitude that is greater than opinion, yet different to 
knowledge, because not grounded upon sufficient evidence. Kant does not himself read 
scholastic sources such as Thomas Aquinas and Hugh of St Victor, but the key features of 
this theological tradition are demonstrably mediated to Kant through texts that we know he 
had studied. It is to these texts that we now turn.  
 
 
2.2. Meier, Leibniz, and Locke 
 
As I remarked above, when commentators draw attention to the traditioned nature of Kant’s 
trio of opinion, belief, and knowledge, they tend to nod in the direction of Meier.30 In what 
immediately follows, I will show that although, in broad terms, much of what Meier says 
about practical reason is indeed influential upon Kant, when we get to the more specific 
claims about ‘belief’ (Glaube), in the context of religion, we do not find the two distinctive 
features of the tradition that interest us: faith construed as mid-way between opinion and 
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knowledge, which involves the will assenting to religious propositions with certainty. 
Furthermore, when, in section 3, we get into the fine details of the way in which Kant himself 
distinguishes “opinion” from “belief,” in the context of religion, we find that Kant explicitly 
disagrees with Meier on a range of points. Far from being Kant’s main source for the 
traditional trio of opinion, belief, and knowledge, I will show that by adopting this trio, Kant 
aligns himself against Meier. 
 Where Meier does plausibly emerge as a positive influence upon Kant, is in the 
former’s considerable interest in practical reason, and in a type of practical certainty. In the 
Auszug, Meier writes that “all learned cognition is either practical or speculative,” and that 
“cognition is practical, in so far as it is able to move us in a particular way, to do or omit an 
action.”31 Meier goes on to comment that “whoever wants to improve as much as possible his 
learned cognition, must aver [verhüten] speculation, and seek according to practical 
reason,”32 even going as far as to claim that “no true learned cognition is by its nature 
speculative, but only by virtue of the lack of insight of the learned, who cannot perceive the 
connection with human action, or will not see it.”33 In the Vernunftlehre, Meier goes as far as 
to proclaim that “moral certainty,” which concerns rational and virtuous action, should be 
estimated to enjoy the equivalent of “mathematical certainty.”34 Much of this resonates 
strongly with the priority, certainty, and ubiquity of practical reason in Kant’s critical 
philosophy (see A 795/B 823–A 831/B 859).35 We might also discern the influence of 
Meier’s account of practical reason where Kant talks about pragmatischer Glaube, which, for 
Kant, are beliefs and acceptances that guide practice, such as, for example, the doctor 
diagnosing an illness, or the businessman striking a deal (see A 824/B 852; “Jäsche,” 9:67–
68n).  
 Nonetheless, I have not been able to find, in Meier’s Vernunftlehre, or in the 
abbreviated version of this text, the Auszug (which was heavily used and annotated by Kant), 
the traditional feature of faith that we will identify in Kant: that faith is somehow a “stage” 
(Stufe) or a hybrid between opinion and knowledge, and that the will assents to the 
propositions of faith, holding to them with a certainty equivalent to knowledge. In the 
Auszug, where Meier discusses belief, he affirms that “to believe means, to accept 
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[annehmen] something for the sake of a witness,” with the scope of such belief limited to 
“past, present and future things,” and not to “other truths.”36 In the longer Vernunftlehre, 
Meier gives a more extensive account of the sort of things which can be witnessed to: not 
only past, present, and future events,37 but also that which is good for the soul38 and our 
eternal well-being. Religious claims certainly come under this aegis. With respect to such 
claims, Meier recommends not certainty, but a “happy middle-state which consists of rational 
belief,” avoiding both incredulity (die Ungläubigkeit) and credulity (die Leichtgläubigkeit).  
 I have also not been able to find these two distinctive features of scholastic teaching 
in key texts by Baumgarten39 or Crusius.40 Wolff, promisingly, has a chapter title which 
contains the trio “Wissenschaft, Glauben, Meinungen.”41 But Wolff does not, in this section, 
describe belief as a stage or hybrid between knowledge and opinion. Also, we do not find 
Wolff associating belief with an act of the will. By “belief,” in this text, Wolff means, simply, 
“the approval, which one gives to a statement by virtue of the witness of another.”42 Having 
set out his account of “belief,” the remainder of Wolff’s discussion of “Glaube” is dedicated 
to setting out grounds for attributing trustworthiness, or not, to a witness.43  
 We get much closer to Kant’s treatment of Glaube, in relation to Meinung and 
Wissen, when we look at the work of John Locke. We know Locke to have been a significant 
figure for Kant, because of numerous references throughout his corpus (see, for example, Ax, 
A 86/B 119; A 95/B 127; Prolegomena, 4: 257, 289; CPrR 5:352; CF 7:135), and to the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding in particular (see Prolegomena, 4:270). We also 
know that Kant read Poley’s German 1757 translation of Locke’s Essay on Human 
Understanding.44 More significant still, for our purposes, is that Kant explicitly refers to a 
particular passage from the Essay, which sits in precisely the part of Locke’s text which lays 
out the various textures of assent, such as knowledge, belief and opinion.45 In the translation 
of Locke that Kant would have read, as I will show, we find the two relevant features of the 
scholastic discussion: that belief is in some sense between knowledge and opinion, and that 
the will is involved in belief. Kant may also have received the relevant passages from Locke 
mediated through Leibniz’s French commentary on Locke (New Essays), itself based upon a 
translation (into French) by Pierre Coste.46 In any case, whether through Locke via Poley (in 
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German), or Locke via Leibniz (in French), it seems possible that Locke could have been a 
source for Kant.  
 Locke introduces the trio in the context of considering cases where we adhere to a 
truth, but where “the Demonstration, by which it was at first known, is forgot, though a Man 
may be thought rather to believe his Memory, than really to know.” About “this way of 
entertaining a Truth,” Locke says that it “seem’d formerly to me” to be “like something 
between Opinion and Knowledge, a sort of Assurance which exceeds bare Belief, for that 
relies on the Testimony of another.”47 
As Kant would have read the passage just set out above, it is rendered by Poley in the 
following translation: 
 
<ext> 
Diese Art, eine Wahrheit anzunehmen, mir vormals etwas zu seyn schien, das fast zwischen 
der Meinung und der Wissenschaft das Mittel hält, eine Gattung der Gewißheit, die noch über 
den bloßen Glauben geht, als welcher sich auf das Zeugnis eines andern gründet. (Versuch, 
Bk. IV, Ch.1, §9, 528–29) 
</ext> 
  
Locke’s estimation of this epistemic texture has increased, as he goes on to say that “upon a 
due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in effect true 
Knowledge” (befinde ich bei einer rechten Untersuchung dennoch, daß die einer 
vollkommenen Gewißheit nichts nachgiebt, und in der That eine wahre Erkenntniß ist).48 
Leibniz, following Locke, renders the relevant passage in the following terms:  
 
<ext> 
In such a case [of a remembered demonstration] “it seemed to me like something between 
opinion and knowledge, a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief [relying] on testimony 
of another; yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty.”49 (New 
Essays, IV.1.9) 
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</ext> 
 
In his later text, Theodicy (1710), Leibniz, significantly, applies such a “going beyond 
opinion” not only to the case of remembered demonstrations, but in the context of belief in 
God: 
 
<ext> 
Nevertheless divine faith itself, when it is kindled in the soul, is something more than an 
opinion [etwas mehr, als eine blosse Meinung], and depends not upon the occasions or the 
motives that have given it birth; it advances beyond the intellect, and takes possession of the 
will and of the heart, to make us act with zeal and joyfully as the law of God commands. 
Then we have no further need to think of reasons or to pause over the difficulties of argument 
which the mind may anticipate. (Theodicy, §29, 91)   
</ext> 
 
Kant could also have found in Locke (via Poley and/or Leibniz) the notion that belief, as a 
firm assent of the mind, is often necessary in cases of practical reason. Locke writes that 
there are cases where “we are forced to determine our selves on the one side or other”: 
 
<ext> 
The conduct of our Lives, and the management of our great Concerns, will not bear delay: for 
those depend, for the most part, on the determination of our Judgement in points, wherein we 
are not capable of certain and demonstrable Knowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to 
embrace [ergreifen müssen] the one side, or the other.50 (Essay, IV.xvi.3) 
</ext> 
 
We find, therefore, that there is often a “necessity of believing, without knowledge” (ohne 
gewisse Erkenntniß . . . glauben müssen), “in this fleeting state of Action and Blindness.”51 
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 There is a feature of Locke’s original discussion which becomes obscured in the 
German translation, possibly with creative results for Kant. Locke uses two terms (‘belief’ 
and ‘faith’), where the German translation uses just one (Glaube). Locke uses the term 
‘belief’ in the context of “mundane” beliefs, and the word ‘faith’ only in the context of 
revelation. Poley uses the term Glaubensache (matters of faith) only in the context of 
revelation, but otherwise will happily use Glaube and glauben to cover both Locke’s 
mundane “belief” and religious “faith.” It is hard to be certain, but the intriguing possibility 
arises that certain connections in Kant’s mind could have been assisted by a number of 
conflations occurring in the process of translation. Possibly, it might have assisted Kant to 
come to his position that Locke (as read in the German) uses the same term, Glaube, to 
convey both urgent practical assents, and religious propositions. This may have eased the 
movement in Kant’s mind, from the urgent needs of practical reasons, to the categories of 
faith. Locke, in the original English, held these two categories apart, but this distinction is 
obscured in the German translation.  
 When Locke does discuss explicitly religious “faith” (translated simply as Glaube), 
he describes it as the “Assent [Beifall] to any Proposition, not thus made out by Deductions 
of Reason; but upon the Credit of the Proposer,” that is, “as coming from GOD, in some 
extraordinary way of communication,” which “we call Revelation [Offenbarung].”52 The 
scope of “revelation” is heavily circumscribed by Locke: it must not “shake or over-rule plain 
Knowledge,” or be “in a direct contradiction to the clear Evidence” of our “own 
understanding.”53 Indeed, whether something “be divine Revelation, or no, Reason [Vernunft] 
must judge.”54 Nonetheless, “an evident Revelation,” Locke affirms, “ought to determine our 
Assent even against Probability”: 
 
<ext> 
Reason, in that particular Matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, Faith gave 
the Determination [der Glaube es bestimmt], where Reason came short; and Revelation 
discovered on which side the Truth lay. (Essay, IV.xviii.9, 695) 
</ext> 
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“Faith,” informed by revelation, “ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and 
Interests, and hath a right to be received with full Assent [mit völligem Beifall],” in a way that 
“shakes not the Foundations of Reason, but leaves us that Use of our Faculties, for which 
they were given us.”55 Describing the “Assent,” which is given to “Faith,” Locke writes that 
it “absolutely determines our Minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering as our 
Knowledge it self”: 
 
<ext> 
Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of room 
for Doubt and Hesitation. (Essay, IV.xvi.14, 667) 
</ext> 
 
As well as locating faith between opinion and knowledge, Locke and Leibniz both support 
the notion of a legitimate assent (Beifall) to religious propositions, where the certainty 
attached to this assent goes beyond the probable evidence. This “going beyond” is achieved, 
as it is in the scholastic tradition, by a direct act of the will. Also true to the traditional 
conception of faith, this act of the will does not lessen the commitment to the truth of what is 
so believed.   
 What emerges is that through Locke and Leibniz (and Leibniz reading Locke), we can 
tentatively identify a possible, albeit delicate, bridge back into the scholastic sources. Locke 
could have received a traditional account of faith from Richard Hooker, who himself draws 
upon Thomas Aquinas. We know that Locke read and esteemed Hooker, although precisely 
how much Hooker Locke read is hard to determine.56 In any case, Hooker communicates at 
least two strands of the traditional scholastic account of faith.57 First, that faith is an action of 
the will. Secondly, that the “certainty of adherence” is “greater in us” than the certainty of 
evidence, because “the hart doth cleave and stick unto that which it doth believe,” so that “all 
the world is not able quite and cleane to remove him from it.”58 Accordingly, Locke, possibly 
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drawing upon Hooker, affirms that “belief” requires an assent of the will, which goes beyond 
the evidence, which belief is fully committed to the truth of what is assented to.  
 Now that we have a sense of how the scholastic tradition could have been mediated to 
Kant, we are well-prepared to consider Kant’s various texts about the status of Glaube, in 
relation to opinion and knowledge. We will find that both continuities and discontinuities 
emerge, between Kant and the medieval heritage that he receives.  
 
 
3. Kant on Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge 
 
In 1796 Kant summarizes the “three stages of apprehension, down to its disappearance in 
total ignorance” (RPT, 8:396). The three stages are, “knowledge, belief, and opinion” (RPT 
8:396). Consistently, in a range of other texts, Kant splices this traditional distinction with his 
own hardly limpid terminology of subjective and objective sufficiency. We find the following 
in the “Canon” of the first Critique: 
 
<ext> 
Taking something to be true [fürwahrhalten] . . . has the following three stages in relation to 
conviction [Überzeugung] . . . : having an opinion, believing and knowing. Having an 
opinion [meinen] is taking something to be true with the consciousness that it is subjectively 
[subjekti] as well as objectively insufficient [objektiv unzureichendes]. If taking something to 
be true is only subjectively sufficient and is at the same time held to be objectively 
insufficient, then it is called believing [glauben]. Finally, when the taking something to be 
true is both subjectively and objectively sufficient it is called knowing [wissen]. Subjective 
certainty is called conviction (for myself) [Überzeugung für mich selbst], objective 
sufficiency, certainty (for everyone) [Gewißheit für jedermann]. I will not pause for the 
exposition of such readily grasped concepts. (A 822/B 850) 
</ext> 
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Kant’s confidence that he does not need to pause “for the exposition of such readily grasped 
concepts” (A 822/B 850) has been found by later commentators to be too optimistic. In fact, 
though, when looking at Kant’s wider oeuvre,59 in particular his lectures on logic given in the 
1780s and 90s, it is indeed clear and unambiguous what he means by these terms. The best 
way to understand precisely how Kant construes the role of “subjective sufficiency” in 
“belief,” is to contrast this with how he uses this notion in the alternative states of knowing 
and opining.  
 
 
3.1. The State of Knowing 
 
When our “holding-for-true” has the status of knowledge, objective and subjective 
sufficiency run together: 
 
<ext> 
When taking something to be true is both subjectively and objectively sufficient it is called 
knowing. (A 822/B 850) 
</ext> 
 
Kant never discusses a texture of “holding-to-be-true” that enjoys objective but not subjective 
sufficiency. It is worthwhile taking some time to understand why the state of knowing, for 
Kant, enjoys both objective and subjective sufficiency, when one might think it would be 
enough for knowledge to be “objectively sufficient.” The key lies in Kant’s insistence that his 
“science of logic” is concerned not with the truth of propositions, but with the relationship 
between such truths and our judgement (that is, judgements made by subjects). In the 1790s, 
Kant explains that while “truth is an objective property of cognition . . . the relation to an 
understanding and thus to a particular subject, is, subjectively, holding-to-be-true” (“Jäsche,” 
9:65–66).60 Fundamentally, we have here a distinction between evidence and adherence, 
already explored in section 2: on the one hand, the evidence that belongs to the “object” itself 
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(Euclid’s theorems, for example), and, on the other hand, the ‘holding-to-be-true,’ which 
pertains to the assent given by a judging subject.61 The “ground of determination to approval” 
is “composed of objective and subjective grounds,” although most people, Kant complains, 
“do not analyse this mixed effect” (“Jäsche,” 9:73). This distinction, between evidence and 
adherence, will become important further down, when we come to Kant’s account of the role 
of the will in “belief.” 
 First, though, we need to understand the heavily circumscribed and limited role of the 
will, for Kant, in the state of knowing. Alix Cohen demonstrates that there is an important 
contrast, in Kant’s writings, between the state of knowing, and the process of acquiring 
knowledge.62 In the state of knowing, the will has no immediate role, although in the process 
of acquiring knowledge, it does have what can be called an indirect role. Kant’s distinction 
between knowing, and the process of acquiring knowledge, circles around a fairly intuitive 
distinction, shared and refined by recent epistemologists,63 and encapsulated nicely by 
Cohen, when she writes that “believing is indeed unlike acting,” whereas “acquiring a belief 
is like action insofar as they are both guided by maxims that are under our direct voluntary 
control.”64  
 If, for example, we properly understand the terms involved in a Euclidean or 
philosophical proof, we must simply accept the demonstration, whether we like it or not. In 
such a case, Kant writes, “the will does not have any influence immediately [keinen 
unmittelbaren Einfluß] on holding-to-be-true,” because “the will cannot struggle against 
convincing proofs of truth that are contrary to its wishes and inclinations” (“Jäsche,” 9:73–
74; see also “Dohna-Wundlacken Logic,” 24:736; Refl., 2508, 16:398). Aquinas, 
representative of the mainstream scholastic analysis, similarly reports that in such cases of 
knowledge, the “intellect is determined,” with no proper scope for the will to dissent (De 
veritate, 14.1). When something is known in this way, as it is in the case of geometry, we 
give “absolute adherence” to the proposition in question (De veritate, 14.1). The case is 
different, for Kant, when it comes to undertaking responsible investigations into truth-claims, 
and developing a well-informed, and critical attitude. Kant explains that although “holding-
to-be-true pertains to the understanding,” “investigation” belongs “to the faculty of choice” 
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(“Dohna-Wundlacken Logic,” 24:746).65 In such a case, Kant explains, we would not say that 
“approval” depends “immediately” upon our “choice,” but, rather, that it depends “on it 
indirectly, mediately”: 
 
<ext> 
 Since it is according to one’s free wish that he seeks out those grounds that could in any way 
bring about approval for this or that cognition. (“Blomberg Logic,” 24:158) 
</ext> 
 
Kant states that although “for common cognition it is not necessary that we be 
conscious of these rules and reflect on them,” if we wish to ascend to “learned cognition,” in 
contested and complex areas, then “our understanding” must “be conscious of its rules and 
use them in accordance with reflection, because here common practice is not enough for it” 
(“Blomberg Logic,” 24:27). In the state of knowing, the will has an indirect role in the 
process of acquiring knowledge, through the adoption and execution of second-order 
epistemic principles, which leads to an assent with certainty; whereas in the state of 
believing, the will has a direct role in the assenting with certainty. We will be better equipped 
to approach this aspect of “belief,” in Kant, after we have analyzed the state of “opining,” to 
which I now turn. 
 
 
3.2. The State of Opining  
 
The state of “opining,” for Kant, is beset by a contingency and “insufficiency.” Significantly, 
when we opine, we fail even to enjoy “subjective sufficiency.” This indicates that “subjective 
sufficiency” is an epistemic achievement of some substance: 
 
<ext> 
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Opining is a holding-to-be-true that is, with consciousness, both subjectively and objectively 
insufficient. An insufficient holding-to-be-true is what does not suffice to exclude the 
opposite. He who only opines is still open to opposing grounds. (“Dohna-Wundlacken 
Logic,” 24:732; see also A 822/B 850) 
</ext> 
 
We are in the state of opining when we hold to a proposition on grounds that are, in their 
current state, insufficient for knowledge, but where, if more evidence becomes available, the 
state of opining can become the state of knowing.  
 
<ext> 
When something is held true on objective though consciously insufficient grounds, and hence 
is merely opinion, this opining can gradually be supplemented by the same kind of grounds 
and finally become a knowing. (WDO 8:141) 
</ext> 
 
On this point, Kant follows his immediate sources such as Wolff,66 Meier,67 and Locke,68 
who themselves trace over lines of thought that can be identified in the scholastic tradition,69 
which itself draws upon Aristotle.70   
 Whereas the state of knowing involves apodeictic or assertoric certainty, for rational 
and empirically resourced knowledge respectively, the state of opining only ever involves a 
“problematic judging”: 
 
<ext> 
For what I merely opine I hold in judging, with consciousness, only to be problematic. 
(“Jäsche,” 9:66) 
</ext> 
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Even though both objectively and subjectively insufficient, the state of opining is an 
unavoidable epistemic state. The state of opining can be preparatory for knowing (“Jäsche,” 
9:66–67; see also Refl., 2462, 16:380). The important thing is not to avoid opining, but to 
“guard oneself against holding an opinion to be something more than mere opinion” 
(“Jäsche,” 9:66). Similar warnings against ascribing too much weight to opinions are found 
in Kant’s sources such as Locke71 and Meier, who again reflect material found in scholastic 
sources. Meier states that in the case of opining, because one has “no demonstration” (keine 
Demonstration), there remains a “fear” (so bleibet noch immer die Furcht übrig), that “things 
might be other than assumed in the opinion” (es könne vielleicht auch wohl anders seyn).72 
The reference to “fear” finds a direct scholastic counterpart, with Aquinas stating that to be in 
a state of opinion is to “assent to one of two opposite assertions, with fear of the other [cum 
formidine alterius], so that the adherence is not firm” (Sum. theol. Ia–IIae.67.3), where, “by 
definition,” “opinion” means that the “object is thought of as able to be otherwise than it is” 
(Sum. theol. IIa–IIae.1.5, ad 4). 
 
 
3.3. The State of Believing 
 
The state of knowing, we have seen, possesses the certainty of evidence (“objective 
sufficiency”), which carries automatically the certainty of adherence (“subjective 
sufficiency”). The state of opining lacks both the certainty of evidence, and the certainty of 
adherence; adherence would be improper, because the evidence is insufficient. The state of 
believing, though, involves the adherence (subjective sufficiency), but without the evidence 
(objective sufficiency): 
 
<ext> 
If taking something to be true is only subjectively sufficient and is at the same time held to be 
objectively insufficient, then it is called believing. (A 822/B 850). 
</ext> 
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We have a proper object of “belief” when we are concerned with reason in its practical 
capacity, which concerns itself with what ought to be done:  
 
<ext> 
The meaning of this form of assent, distinct from the opinion and knowledge that are founded 
on judgment in the theoretical sense, can now be expressed in the term belief, whereby we 
understand an assumption, presupposition or hypothesis, which is necessary only because it is 
necessarily implied by an objective practical rule of conduct. (Progress, 20:297) 
</ext> 
 
In this article, I am concerned, specifically, with the category of “moral belief,” 
which, for Kant, is the strict and proper type of “belief.” At points, Kant does discuss other 
types of belief, or, to use a term employed both by Kant and recent epistemology, other types 
of “acceptance” (Annehmung).73 Kant discusses “pragmatic” (A 824/B 852) and “doctrinal” 
belief/acceptance (A 826–27/B 854–55), relating, respectively, to beliefs/acceptances that 
guide practice (for example, the doctor diagnosing an illness), and beliefs/acceptances that 
guide investigation into the natural world. Belief in God as the intelligent designer of nature 
is, Kant claims, such a “doctrinal” belief, and is indispensable when seeking systematic 
patterns of order in the natural world. Moral belief in God is different in kind from doctrinal 
and pragmatic belief (A 829/B 857). This is clarified in the late 1780s and 90s where Kant 
explains that “belief in the proper sense” is restricted to “moral belief in God” (“Jäsche,” 
9:72n; see also “Jäsche,” 9:67–68)74: 
 
<ext> 
This practical conviction is thus moral belief of reason, which alone can be called a belief in 
the proper sense and be opposed as such to knowledge and to all theoretical or logical 
conviction in general, because it can never elevate itself to knowledge. (“Jäsche,” 9:72n)  
</ext> 
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The state of believing “in the proper sense,” that is, belief in God and immortality, 
can never become knowledge: 
 
<ext> 
Pure rational faith can never be transformed into knowledge by any natural data or reason or 
experience, because here the ground of holding true is merely subjective, namely a necessary 
need of reason (and as long as we are human beings it will always remain a need)  to 
presuppose the existence of a highest being, but not to demonstrate it. (WDO 8:141) 
</ext> 
 
In the 1770s, Kant writes that such “moral belief” enjoys “moral certainty,” and that this can 
be asserted “in all conscientiousness” (Refl., 2470, 16:383). It is not that we can choose to 
“believe” anything we like with “moral certainty.” Only where we need to believe something, 
in order to secure the project of morality, are we permitted to do so. In 1786, Kant insists that 
“rational faith,” because it “rests on a need of reason’s use with a practical intent,” “is not 
inferior in degree to knowing, even though it is completely different from it in kind” (WDO 
8:141–42). With such rational faith, we are properly conscious of the “firmness” (Fertigkeit) 
and “unalterability” (Unveränderlichkeit) of the belief in God (WDO 8:141n), even though 
such belief is not “an insight” which does “justice to all the logical demands for certainty” 
(WDO 8:141).  
 In his association of Glaube with certainty, Kant can be seen to choose one set of 
sources over another. In particular, by ascribing certainty to Glaube, Kant distances himself 
from Meier. This is significant, because, as I have already commented, Meier is often 
identified as the most likely “source” for Kant’s account of faith.75 The terms in which Meier 
discusses “belief” are those that the scholastic tradition (and Kant) would associate with 
merely probable “opinion.” Meier comments that “no mere belief can free us from fear of its 
opposite [von aller Furcht des Gegentheils].”76 Any belief is in the realm of “probability” 
(Wahrscheinlichkeit).77 This contrasts with Kant’s insistence, in the early 1790s, that the 
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“expression of probability,” in the case of belief in God, is “altogether absurd” (Progress, 
20:299). This is because the “modality of our assent” (Progress, 20:297), to the proposition 
that there is a God, is not a case of opinion, because the “super-sensible differs in its very 
species from the sensuously knowable” such that there is “no way at all of reaching it by 
those very same steps whereby we may hope to arrive at certainty in the field of the 
sensible”: 
 
<ext> 
Thus there is no approximation to it either, and therefore no assent whose logical value could 
be called probability. (Progress, 20:299) 
</ext> 
 
Kant shows himself to be aware of the identification of belief with probability, 
writing in 1796 that the term Glaube is “used, on occasion,” as “a synonym for holding 
something to be probable” (RPT 8:396). Kant is resolute that this is an inappropriate use of 
the term Glaube, because about “that which lies beyond all bounds of possible experience, 
we can say neither that it is probable, nor that it is improbable” (RPT 8:396n). Where the 
“object is in no way the object of a knowledge possible to us” such as with “the nature of the 
soul, qua living substance, in the absence of any connection with a body, i.e., as a spirit,” 
then “about its possibility we can judge neither the probability nor the improbability, since 
we cannot judge at all” (RPT 8:396n):  
 
<ext> 
For the alleged grounds of knowledge are in a series which comes nowhere near to the 
sufficient reason, and thus to knowledge itself, since they relate to something super-sensible 
of which, as such, no theoretical knowledge is possible. (RPT 8:396n) 
</ext> 
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Kant goes on to attack another feature of Meier’s account of Glaube. Meier, as seen 
above, identifies belief with accepting “something for the sake of a witness,”78 which can 
include, for Meier, a witness making (more or less probable) religious statements about the 
soul.79 Kant writes that Glaube is not, strictly speaking, the correct concept to apply to such 
“witness of another,” which “allegedly has reference to something super-sensible” (RPT 
8:396n). This is because the “authenticity” of any “report” would always be “an empirical 
matter,” and the “person in whose testimony I am to believe must be an object of an 
experience” (RPT 8:396n). The situation is made worse, not better, by claiming that the 
witness comes from a “super-sensible being,” as I “can be taught by no experience” as to the 
“very existence” of this “being,” nor “as to the fact that it is such a being who testifies this to 
me” (RPT 8:396n). The fact that “there is no theoretical belief in the super-sensible” (RPT 
8:396n), rules out the association of Glaube with probability, or testimony, both of which, for 
Kant, are branches of theoretical reason. It is only “in a practical (morally-practical) sense” 
that “a belief in the super-sensible is not only possible, but is actually inseparably bound up 
with that point of view” (RPT 8:396n).  
 Instead, Kant aligns himself with a strand of thought, traced in the last section through 
Leibniz, Locke, and Hooker, which goes back to the mainstream scholastic account set out by 
Aquinas. In this account, belief is sui generis, sharing features that belong to both opinion 
and knowledge: like opinion, it lacks the evidence sufficient for knowledge, but unlike 
opinion, belief is characterized by a willful certainty; the certainly resembles the state of 
knowing, but unlike knowing, belief requires a free assent of the will. As we saw, in the act 
of believing, of which belief in God is the paradigm, the believer “settles upon one side of the 
question,” in “virtue of his will [per voluntatem]” (Sum. theol. IIa–IIae.2.1, ad 3), and 
becomes “firmly attached to one alternative,” and “in this respect the believer is in the same 
state of mind as one who has science or understanding” (Sum. theol. IIa–IIae.2.1), even 
though belief is “imperfect as knowledge,” as it is “without clarity or vision” (Sum. theol. Ia–
IIae.67.3).  
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3.4. Conviction (for Myself) 
 
We are now in a position to dispel the apparently “relativistic” associations (“true for me”) 
that might surround Kant’s talk of subjective sufficiency providing “conviction (for myself),” 
(A 822/B 850), “only for me” (“Jäsche,” 9:66), but not “certainty (for everyone)” (A 822/B 
850), which “holds for all” (“Jäsche,” 9:66). It is helpful to always have in sight the contrast 
with the states of knowing and opining. As we saw, the state of knowing does not arise from 
a positive and direct free movement of the will. The will is, as we saw, mediately involved, 
through the selection and execution of second-order epistemic principles of investigation. 
Nonetheless, in the state of knowing, when presented with a mathematical or philosophical 
demonstration, for example, there is no role for free choice, as what is known is “universally 
and objectively necessary (holding for all)” (“Jäsche,” 9:66). In the state of opining, strictly 
speaking, we should not be “convinced” (überzeugt) at all. The will has, accordingly, a 
limited role: of adopting (in an unconvinced way) various hypotheses, as and when they are 
useful, potentially even switching between inconsistent hypotheses, if a project of enquiry is 
benefitted by so doing. To this extent, there is a degree of freedom in the state of opining, 
although it is a freedom from assent, not towards it. As Kant puts the contrast, “with belief 
one accepts something, and one is decided [entschieden]. With opinion . . . one is still free” 
(Refl., 2463, 16:381).80 It is only in the domain of belief that the will, for Kant, plays a role 
that is positive and immediate: moving (properly) in freedom to assent with certainty, to that 
which cannot be known. As we saw in section 2, we find this same commitment paralleled in 
the scholastic tradition, represented by Aquinas, and mediated to Kant through sources such 
as Locke and Leibniz.  
 For Kant, the will is universally summoned to belief, albeit not compelled. Every 
single individual “I” contemplating the “laws of freedom,” which require belief in the 
possibility of the “highest good in the world,” ought, in freedom, to believe in God, on moral 
grounds. The subjective grounds of moral belief universally require belief, which Kant 
reflects can “possess practical adequacy for all human beings” (Refl., 2470, 16:383). But 
these same grounds do not compel assent in the way that Euclid’s laws do. When Kant writes 
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that subjective grounds hold “for me,” we need to understand that “me” is a type of “every-
me” (along the lines of “everyman”): “me” refers to every moral subject determining their 
attitude, in freedom, to the moral law. The justification for believing is indexed to these 
universally binding, but resistible (hence the freedom), demands of practical reason, and not 
to the particular constitution and temperament of any empirical individual. So when Kant 
writes that the “free holding-to-be-true” is “necessary for moral purposes for completion of 
one’s ends” (“Jäsche,” 9:69n), he means the completion of the rational ends of any, and 
every, moral being, which involves the “necessity” of accepting “the objective reality of a 
concept (of the highest good),” where “the condition of this possibility” is “God, freedom, 
and immorality” (“Jäsche,” 9:68n).  
 When Kant writes, therefore, that belief “yields a conviction [Überzeugung] that is 
not communicable (because of its subjective ground)” (Refl., 2489, 16:391–92), he is doing 
no more than stating the (now) obvious point that belief is not knowledge. Only knowledge 
can be “communicated” in the strong sense of automatically eliciting “universal agreement.” 
This is because, in the state of knowledge, the will has no (proper and direct) choice whether 
to assent or not, such that no direct work needs to be done by the will. Kant sets out the 
contrast, between unfree-knowing and free-believing, in precisely these terms: 
 
<ext> 
The only objects that are matters of belief are those in which holding-to-be-true is  necessarily 
free [nothwendig frei], i.e., is not determined through objective grounds [objective Gründe] 
of truth that are independent of the nature and the interest of the subject. (“Jäsche,” 9:70) 
</ext> 
 
Kant explicitly explains the claim that belief is “free” through the contrast with 
knowing, where the “objective grounds of truth” simply compel the assent of the judging 
subject, providing automatically “subjective sufficiency.” Whenever Kant talks about the 
state of believing as only something “for me,” the concept of freedom is never far away, and 
the contrast is always the lack of (immediate and positive) freedom involved with knowing: 
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<ext> 
What remains here is a free holding-to-be-true, which is necessary only in a practical respect 
given a priori, hence a holding-to-be-true of what I accept on moral grounds, and in such a 
way that I am certain that the opposite can never be proved. (“Jäsche,” 9:67) 
</ext> 
 
<ext> 
Hence I can only say that I see myself necessitated through my end, in accordance with laws 
of freedom, to accept as possible a highest good in the world, but I cannot necessitate anyone 
else through grounds (the belief is free). (“Jäsche,” 9:69n) 
</ext> 
 
In my introductory remarks, I observed that Kant’s emphasis upon the need for a 
voluntary dimension, in the case of belief in God, can look rather “post-Christian” and 
deflationary, suggesting that such belief is a mere heuristic believing “as if” there is a God. 
By reading Kant in the context of scholastic accounts of faith, mediated to Kant through early 
modern sources, we have gained a new perspective: when Kant invokes a voluntary 
dimension to faith, whereby one chooses to believe something, this does not, in itself, 
denigrate the degree to which Kant is committed to the truth of what is believed in. Rather, it 
suggests a traditional notion of faith, whereby there is a positive and immediate role for free 
choice. This is a significant finding, in that it opens up a subtle epistemic texture, which has 
been to some degree neglected in the recent literature on epistemology, and, also, by Kant 
commentators.81 In the recent literature on epistemology, a direct and positive involvement of 
the will in an assent tends to be regarded as denigrating the degree of commitment to the truth 
of the assent, in contrast, say, with its regulative “usefulness.”82 Different terms of art are 
used, but we tend to find a distinction between ‘believing-to-be-true,’ or ‘holding true,’ and a 
less committed category of ‘acceptance-as-true’ or ‘holding-as-true,’ where we adopt an 
attitude of acting ‘as if’ something is the case, without really being committed to this as a 
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truth-claim. So, for example, if I am a diligent store worker, I might accept, as a guide to 
action, that “the customer is always right,” although I will not, if I am rational, believe this: 
customers might lie, be mistaken, have unreasonable expectations, and violate or neglect the 
terms of a warranty. Typically, where there is a direct and positive role for the “will,” it is 
assumed that we can only be dealing with “acceptance-as-true” or “holding as true” (which 
would correspond to Kant’s category of merely pragmatic belief), rather than “belief-in-
truth,” or “holding true.” This is not an unreasonable assumption. It is fairly intuitive to 
regard the actual state of believing something as involuntary, even if the process of 
investigating beliefs involves a voluntary dimension. When we really believe something to be 
true, rather than being useful, the intuition is that there is something non-negotiable about the 
assent; where there is a degree of choice involved, we seem to be in the realm of heuristic 
fictions. It is precisely because these are intuitive associations, that engaging in the history of 
philosophy can be rewarding on this point. In the scholastic account of faith, we find that a 
strong role for the will, acting in freedom, is in no way an indication that an assent is a 
merely regulative as if  acceptance, rather than being a belief in the truth of the matter.83 
 To this extent, then, something that seems deflationary in Kant, turns out to be 
traditional. In my introductory remarks, I also promised that an aspect of Kant’s thought that 
seems traditional, namely, Kant’s association of faith and moral conversion, will turn out to 
be revolutionary. It is to this that I now turn.  
 
 
4. Tradition and the Kantian Turn 
 
Both Aquinas and Kant regard faith as certain, even though the degree of “evidence” that we 
have for faith does not compel the assent of the will, but, rather, the will must choose to 
assent. For Kant, this certainty arises from the demands of morality. For Aquinas, there is a 
distinct and different source for this knowledge-like certainty: 
 
<ext> 
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Just as science is certain, so also is faith—indeed much more so, because science relies for its 
certainty on human reason, which can be deceived, while faith relies for its certainty on 
divine reason, which cannot be contradicted. (In Iob, 4:42, no.662)84 
</ext> 
 
For Aquinas, at an ultimate level of explanation, faith is something that God achieves in the 
believer, as a participation in God’s own self-knowledge: “this fact that he loves God is the 
result in the human being of sanctifying grace” (Sum. contra gent. 3.2, ch.151.2). Faith is a 
“certain participation in . . . and assimilation to God’s own knowledge, in that by the faith 
infused in us we cling to the first truth for its own sake” (Sup. Boet. De Trin., 2.2c).85  
 For Aquinas, human freedom is threatened when the will is moved in a way that takes 
the creature away from God. When, earlier on, I set out the initial similarity between Kant 
and Aquinas, insofar as they both describe faith as involving a movement of the will, I quoted 
from Aquinas’s De veritate, that the will “totally adheres” to faith, albeit that the intellect is 
not similarly moved (De veritate, 14.1). Also in Aquinas’s discussion at this point, is a 
commitment that Kant would certainly avoid: 
 
<ext> 
For just taken by itself, the intellect is not satisfied and it is not terminated in one part; rather, 
it is terminated only from the outside. And this is why the intellect of one who believes is said 
to be captivated. For it is being held fast by something else's terminus and not by its own 
proper terminus (2 Cor 10:5, “bringing the intellect into captivity”). (De veritate, 14.1) 
</ext> 
 
For Aquinas, the intellect is not “satisfied” by faith, but it is “captivated.” Such 
“captivation,” “from the outside,” would be anathema for Kant. Strikingly, for Kant, the only 
thing that parallels such “captivation” is the submission that the moral law itself requires: 
 
<ext> 
 
 
 
34 
Duty! Sublime and mighty name that embraces nothing charming or insinuating but requires 
submission (Unterwerfung). (CPrR 5:86) 
</ext> 
 
This “submission,” though, is, as Kant goes on immediately to explain, not offered to an 
“external” reality. Addressing “duty,” Kant goes on to ask, “what origin is there worthy of 
you?” (CPrR 5:86). He replies that “every person’s own will,” even when “directed to 
himself,” is “restricted” to no other condition, except “agreement with the autonomy of the 
rational being” (CPrR 5:87). Consequently, no “rational being” is “subjected to any purpose 
that is not possible in accordance with a law that could arise from the will of the affected 
subject himself” (CPrR 5:87). As rational beings we are bound only to “the sublimity of our 
nature (in its vocation)” (CPrR 5:87).  
 In associating human freedom with faith, Kant is aligned with the medieval tradition 
and his sources.86 What human freedom is, though, for Kant, and for the medieval tradition, 
is widely divergent. For the medieval tradition, supernatural divine action in no way violates 
meaningful human freedom. Indeed, insofar as it brings us closer to God, such supernatural 
action constitutes freedom. Not so for Kant, who finds that the “faith which our reason can 
develop out of itself” (CF 7:59) must arise from human freedom, and from human freedom 
alone, without God’s inner transformation of our will. This radical departure underlies, and 
explains, Kant’s insistence that grace follows rather than precedes free moral conversion. 
This sets the terms for Kant’s positive translation of the categories of grace, and divine-
human cooperation, into notions that are acceptable to the pure religion of reason. 
 
 
5. Kant’s Reinterpretation of Grace and Divine Cooperation 
 
In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant allows a positive role for a divine 
supplement, or assistance, which comes after the person has, in freedom, set their will 
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towards the moral law.87 As Mariña puts it, such “divine aid” must “be laid hold of by the 
person,”88 and, significantly, “does not alter a person’s will at the outset” but is: 
 
<ext> 
Some historical occurrence—a person or situation—to which the person must respond in 
some way. Only after the practical and existential import of the person or situation has been 
assessed and interiorised by the individual can it affect a person’s character. (“Kant on 
Grace,” 386) 
</ext> 
 
Crucial here is the preservation of the “free choice of the individual,” which, Kant insists, 
must be in held in place, if “the concept of grace is not to be one that ignores the agent qua 
agent.”89 Having begun the “journey towards holiness,” without supernatural assistance, we 
might hope for some assistance against “residual consequences of the propensity to evil” that 
“will still haunt the person,” where “growth in virtue will only be achieved through an 
incessant counteracting of these effects.”90 The individual must “make himself antecedently 
worthy of receiving” the grace as assistance (Rel., 6:44). The assistance that the individual 
might then accept consists, Kant states, of the “diminution of obstacles” or some sort of 
“positive assistance (Beistand)” (Rel., 6:44), which might help to “supplement the 
deficiency” in our “moral capacity” (Rel., 6:174). 
 What seems to run through Kant’s reinterpretation of grace and concurrence is the 
conviction that divine action must be reactive to independent human freedom moving 
towards moral conversion and its accompanying faith, rather than divine action proactively 
initiating free moral action. We see this in the case of reactive divine supplementation of 
moral human effort. We can also detect such reactive divine action in Kant’s notion of a 
partnership between God and human beings, in the creation of an “ethical commonwealth.” 
Kant states that we need a “higher moral being” through “whose universal organisation the 
forces of single individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a common effect” (Rel., 
6:98), such that “a moral people of God is, therefore, a work whose execution cannot be 
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hoped for from human beings but only from God himself” (Rel., 6:100).91 Here divine 
cooperation is seen as supplementing our inability to “join-up” individual (non-concurring 
and free) acts of human moral willing into a significant community.  
 Although translated into Kant’s own terms, this is still a strong commitment on Kant’s 
part. As Pasternack observes, this is a distinctive divine action, in that the integration and 
coordination of individual moral efforts into an ethical community is something that only 
God can do. As put by Pasternack, “with regards to the Ethical Community in particular, 
God’s assistance is now taken as necessary”:  
 
<ext> 
We finally see in Kant a clear commitment to God having a necessary soteriological role. 
Moreover, our inability to achieve this victory is due to our innate limitations. (Kant on 
Religion, 256)  
</ext> 
 
 In a further passage, from the Third Parerga of Religion, Kant reflects upon the 
inability of the human being to “realise the idea of the supreme good inseparably bound up 
with the pure moral disposition,” whether that be “with respect to the happiness which is part 
of that good or with respect to the union of the human beings necessary to the fulfilment of 
the end” (Rel., 6:139). Nonetheless, there is “also in him the duty to promote the idea,” so 
that “he finds himself driven to believe in the cooperation or the management of a moral 
ruler of the world, through which alone this end is possible” (Rel., 6:139). Kant goes onto 
reflect: 
 
<ext> 
And here there opens up before him the abyss of a mystery regarding what God may do, 
whether anything at all is to be attributed to him and what this something might be in 
particular, whereas the only thing that a human being learns from a duty is what he himself 
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must do to become worthy of that fulfilment, of which he has no cognition or at least no 
possibility of comprehension. (Rel., 6:139). 
</ext> 
 
Here it is clear that the human being must still act out of their own freedom, doing “what he 
himself must do,” to use his “powers freely” (Rel., 6:142–43). God is not envisaged as 
cooperating directly within the human action, as a supernatural immediate efficient cause. 
But Kant gestures to the mystery of what God might do alongside our non-concurring and 
supersensible human action, in order to secure the possibility of the highest good.  
Rather than saying Kant rejects, or denies, grace and divine cooperation in the context 
of moral conversion and its accompanying faith, it is more illuminating to say that he offers 
reinterpretations of the traditional scholastic supernatural accounts, setting out something that 
is theologically substantial, but which nonetheless respects supersensible human freedom, as 
Kant understands it.92  
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